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CHECKING IN: HISTORIC CELL SITE LOCATION 
INFORMATION AND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
Christopher Fox
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twenty-five years, the number of cell phone sub-
scribers in the United States has increased from slightly over 200,000 
in 1985 to roughly 293 million in 2010.
1
  Cell phones are now the on-
ly phones used in over one quarter of all American households, a 
percentage that has nearly tripled in the last five years.
2
  Moreover, 
several modern phones are equipped with GPS programs that allow 
subscribers to accurately and easily navigate to their destination
3
 us-
ing the phone that they likely have on or near their person for the 
majority of the day. 
As technology has developed over the last quarter century, the 
average person’s life has changed through the adoption and utiliza-
tion of new devices.  Not only are cell phones regularly used for 
checking emails or updating one’s Facebook status, but the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) estimates that wireless phones 
are responsible for about seventy percent of all 911 calls.
4
  In re-
 
 * J.D., May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, The University 
of Texas at Austin.  I would like to thank the proprietors of El Dubs for consistently 
giving me gratuitous copies of their daily newspaper with my morning coffee.  The 
Third Circuit decision that is at the heart of this Comment and which piqued my in-
terest in this subject was brought to my attention because of their excellent customer 
service and appreciation. 
 1 CTIA Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA WIRELESS ASS’N, 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA__Survey_Midyear_2010_Graphics.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2011). 
 2 Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA WIRELESS ASS’N, 
http://ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Mar. 2, 
2012) [hereinafter Wireless Quick Facts]. 
 3 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (W.D. Pa. 
2008).  
 4 Wireless 911 Services, FED. COMMS. COMMISSION, 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/wireless911srvc.html (last visited Mar. 2, 
2012); see also 9-1-1 Statistics, NAT’L EMERGENCY NUMBER ASS’N, http://nena.site-
ym.com/?page=911statistics (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (stating that of the estimated 
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sponse to this increasing percentage of wireless 911 calls, the FCC has 
mandated that service providers be able to track ninety percent of 
wireless 911 calls within 300 meters of the point of origin and within 
one hundred meters of the point of origin for one-hundred percent 
of wireless 911 calls by January 18, 2016.
5
 
Tracking a cell phone’s approximate location from connected 
calls has also aided the ends of justice on several occasions.  A hand-
ful of important examples include: recovering a women’s stolen car 
with her five-year-old daughter inside within thirty minutes because 
the young girl answered her mother’s cell phone, which enabled the 
police to use the cell tower information to locate the vehicle;
6
 captur-
ing a fugitive wanted for two murders;
7
 leading police to a suspect, 
who was arrested after a kidnapping and after the murder victim’s 
DNA was found in his car;
8
 providing information that contradicted a 
suspect’s statements about his location at home because records 
showed that his cell phone was used within about three blocks of the 
place of death of his ex-girlfriend shortly before and after she was 
shot;
9
 and the prosecution’s reliance on cell tower record infor-
mation in the highly publicized Scott Peterson murder trial to con-
tradict Peterson’s claim of his whereabouts at a particular time on the 
morning of his wife’s death.
10
  In all of these instances, the govern-
ment used cell site location information (CSLI) to provide an ap-
proximation of a subscriber’s cell phone location. 
Wireless phones are actually sophisticated two-way radios that 
constantly communicate with nearby cell towers.
11
  Through a process 
 
240 million 911 calls annually, one third are wireless calls); Wireless Quick Facts, supra 
note 2 (placing the number of emergency 911 calls at over 296,000 per day). As these 
sources indicate, the percentage of 911 calls attributable to cell phones has consist-
ently and dramatically increased over the last ten years. 
 5 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h) (2011).  
 6 Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding 
the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 310 (2004) 
(citing Girl, 5, Found Safe as Man Steals Car, ROCKY MTN. NEWS Apr. 22, 2004, at A18). 
 7 Id. (citing Don Plummer, Cellphone Betrays Cobb Fugitive, ATLANTA J.- CONST., 
Nov. 9, 2003, at A1). 
 8 Id. (citing Chuck Haga, Sjodin’s Body Found; Officers Find Remains in Ravine Near 
Crookston, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 18, 2004, at B1). 
 9 Id. at 310–11 (citing Holley Gilbert, Vancouver Man Is Arrested in Shooting Death 
of Ex-Girlfriend, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 30, 2004, at B1). 
 10 Id. at 311 (citing Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, The Peterson Trial; Defendant Lied 
Often, Recorded Calls Show; Supporters Misled About Whereabouts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26, 
2004, at B1). 
 11 How Wireless Works, CTIA WIRELESS ASS’N, 
http://ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10324(last visited Mar. 2, 
2012) [hereinafter How Wireless Works]. 
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known as “registration,” a cell phone communicates information 
identifying the phone, subscriber, and service provider to the cell 
tower with the strongest signal, which is then relayed to a mobile tel-
ecommunications switching office (MTSO).
12
  Cellular service provid-
ers (CSPs), like AT&T or Verizon, record and maintain CSLI for bill-
ing and service purposes in their regular course of business.
13
  For 
example, a CSP determines roaming charges based on the cell site 
that a subscriber’s phone uses for a particular call.
14
 
Historic CSLI refers to the records maintained by CSPs that list 
the cell sites with which a subscriber’s cell phone communicated at 
previous points in time, whereas prospective CSLI refers to the cell 
sites that a subscriber’s cell phone will communicate with at a future 
point in time and the CSP will correspondingly record.  Under the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA),
15
 law enforcement agencies may 
compel CSPs to disclose prospective or historic CSLI for a particular 
cell phone in the course of a criminal investigation.  Depending on 
the information that the government seeks, the SCA requires either 
probable cause and a warrant or reasonable suspicion and a court or-
der for compelled disclosure.
16
 
On September 7, 2010, the Third Circuit became the first court 
of appeals to weigh in on the standard required for a court order to 
compel CSPs to disclose historic CSLI to law enforcement agencies 
under § 2703(d) of the SCA.
17
  In In re Application of the United States for 
an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Services to Dis-
close Records to the Government, an Assistant United States Attorney 
(AUSA) sought a § 2703(d) order compelling a CSP to disclose a par-
ticular subscriber’s records in connection with the ongoing investiga-
tion of a second individual suspected of drug trafficking.
18
  Due to the 
government’s difficulties visually surveying the suspected drug traf-
ficker, the AUSA submitted the application for a § 2703(d) order to 
 
 12 In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Loca-
tion Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 13 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (W.D. Pa. 
2008). 
 14 Id. at 590 n.20. 
 15 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006). 
 16 § 2703.  
 17 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 18 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv., 
534 F. Supp. 2d at 587–88. 
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aid in the government’s counter-drug trafficking operations.
19
  The 
suspected drug trafficker’s historic whereabouts could have provided 
the government with evidence of the location(s) of the suspect’s 
criminal activities.
20
  Based on Fourth Amendment privacy concerns 
formed by the belief that historic CSLI could provide the government 
intimate details about an individual’s life, the magistrate judge de-
nied the government’s original request for an order because the law 
enforcement agency failed to show probable cause for obtaining the 
historic CSLI from the CSP.
21
  When the government appealed the 
decision to the district court, that court affirmed the decision in a 
brief two-page opinion based on the finding that the order was “not 
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
22
 
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit vacated the decision and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.
23
  The Third Circuit in-
terpreted the statute to allow a magistrate judge to exercise discretion 
in granting § 2703(d) orders because the language of the statute 
merely sets reasonable suspicion as the minimum requirement for 
granting an order.
24
  Thus, the court did not eliminate the possibility 
of magistrate judges in the Third Circuit using different standards 
when considering such orders; it simply established that reasonable 
suspicion is enough for a judge to grant a law enforcement agency’s 
request for a § 2703(d) order.
25
  If a magistrate judge finds that a war-
rant is required for the § 2703(d) information sought, the magistrate 
judge must make a finding that “the Government’s need . . . for the 
information [outweighs] . . .  the privacy interests of cell phone users” 
before issuing the order.
26
  Because the magistrate judge “never ana-
lyzed whether the Government made a showing” of reasonable suspi-
cion, but instead required a showing of probable cause, the court of 
appeals left the issue for the magistrate judge to determine on re-
mand.
27
 
 
 19 Id. at 588. 
 20 Id. at 588 n.12. 
 21 Id. at 616. 
 22 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, No. 07-524M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98761, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008). 
 23 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 24 Id. at 312. 
 25 See id. 
 26 Id. at 319. 
 27 Id. 
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Historic CSLI, however, should not be afforded any Fourth 
Amendment protection.  The Third Circuit’s failure to differentiate 
between historic and prospective CSLI does not clarify the standards 
that courts should apply to each, nor does it resolve the discrepant 
standards that magistrate judges use when granting or denying § 
2703(d) orders.
28
  Instead of analyzing historic and prospective CSLI 
through the Fourth Amendment jurisprudential lens and then turn-
ing to § 2703(d), the Third Circuit focused on interpreting the statu-
tory language of the SCA.
29
  Thus, when presented with the oppor-
tunity to formulate appropriate guidelines for judges to use for future 
§ 2703(d) order requests from the government, the Third Circuit left 
the matter unresolved. 
Part II of this Comment will explain the process cell phones use 
for sending and receiving calls, messages, and information, as well as 
how CSLI data is computed to produce an approximate location of a 
cell phone.  Part III will provide the relevant Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence, explain the language and protections provided under 
the SCA, and examine the Third Circuit’s interpretation and applica-
tion of the statute to a § 2703(d) order request.  Part IV will argue 
that the Third Circuit’s cursory analysis of historic CSLI in light of 
the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was incorrect, and 
will highlight the resulting failure to set forth guidelines for § 
2703(d) order requests that would end the application of discrepant 
standards.  Finally, Part V will propose an amendment to the statute 
that will eliminate the current discrepancy and clarify the require-
ments for compelled disclosure of historic CSLI. 
II. CELL PHONES AND LOCATION APPROXIMATION 
The crux of the present issue revolves around historic CSLI.  In 
order to fully comprehend the problematic treatment of historic 
CSLI and why it is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, one 
should understand what exactly CSLI comprises and how CSLI is 
used to calculate approximate location. 
A. The Technology of Cell Phones 
Cell phones are sophisticated two-way radios that send and re-
ceive communications through the nearest cell site.
30
  A cell site is the 
 
 28 For a discussion of the discrepant standards that have been applied to § 
2703(d) order requests, see infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra Part III.C. 
 30 In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Loca-
tion Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
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geographical location containing the cell tower, radio transceiver, 
and base station controller.
31
  Manufacturers program every cell 
phone with an Electronic Serial Number (ESN), and, additionally, 
every cell phone is assigned a Mobile Identification Number (MIN) 
based on the subscriber’s phone number.
32
  Moreover, the FCC has 
assigned every CSP a unique System Identification Code (SID).
33
  Eve-
ry cell site broadcasts a control channel,
34
 and every cell phone con-
stantly searches for its CSP’s control channel to ensure communica-
tion with a nearby cell site.
35
 
While a cell site is the actual location of the cell tower and ac-
companying equipment, a cell is the geographical area that is served 
by three cell sites.
36
  Because cell towers are divided into three 120° 
faces, one cell is served by three cell sites.
37
  In turn, each cell site 
serves three separate cells.
38
   
The cell site that communicates with a subscriber’s phone will 
depend on the subscriber’s location within that cell.
39
  “Registration” 
is the process whereby a subscriber’s cell phone searches for its ser-
vice provider’s SID, selects a control channel for communication with 
the base station, and then identifies itself to the cell site.
40
  This in-
formation is then forwarded to the mobile telecommunications 
switching office (MTSO) and stored in a database, completing the 
registration process and allowing calls, messages, and information to 
be directed to the phone.
41
  When a call is placed to a subscriber’s 
phone, the MTSO searches the database to locate the cell that the 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson & Julia Layton, How Cell Phones Work, HOW STUFF 
WORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone.htm/printable (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2012). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id.  A control channel is a special frequency used to broadcast a CSP’s SID 
from a base station to a cell phone, which a subscriber’s phone searches for whenev-
er it is turned on to ensure communication with one of the subscriber’s CSP’s cell 
sites.  Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek, Cell and Sector Terminology, PRIVATE LINE 
(Jan. 1, 2006, 8:55 PM), http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/index.html. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek, Basic Theory and Operation, PRIVATE LINE 
(Jan. 1, 2005, 9:09 PM), http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/index.html.  
 40 In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Loca-
tion Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  The cell phone identifies 
itself to the cell site by transmitting its ESN and MIN to the base station.  Id. 
 41 Id. 
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subscriber’s phone is in, and then it routes the call through the most 
recently registered cell site.
42
  The registration process occurs approx-
imately every seven seconds when the phone is turned on, regardless 
of whether the phone is in use, and it ensures the strongest signal 
strength for the subscriber.
43
 
Importantly, the channel that is used for this process is separate 
from the channel used to transmit the content of calls, messages, or 
information.
44
  When a call is connected to the phone, the control 
channel used for registration is dropped, and a new voice channel 
that has been assigned for the call replaces the registration channel.
45
  
Thus, only the cell site that carried the communication, not the 
communication itself, is recorded by the CSP.
46
 
Furthermore, as a person travels towards the edge of a cell, the 
original base station notes the decrease in signal strength while the 
base station the phone is heading towards recognizes an increase in 
signal strength.
47
  The MTSO coordinates a changeover to the new 
cell site, which the CSP records.
48
 
This continuous process aids in seamlessly sending and receiving 
calls, and it is what allows subscribers to travel several miles while 
maintaining the same uninterrupted phone conversation.
49
  When a 
cell phone travels outside of a subscriber’s home area, another CSP 
will generally provide service for the subscriber’s phone and simply 
signal the subscriber’s home network so that the MTSO knows where 
to direct incoming calls, messages, or information.
50
  Therefore, the 
subscriber’s CSP records and maintains, as a matter of ordinary busi-
 
 42 Brain, Tyson & Layton, supra note 32. 
 43 In re Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750. 
 44 Id.  The significance of this fact is discussed in Part III, infra, which argues that 
the Fourth Amendment does not protect historic CSLI and law enforcement agen-
cies should be able to obtain historic CSLI upon a showing of reasonable suspicion 
because the channel log does not record any communications; it only evidences the 
cell sites with which a particular cell phone communicated at certain times. 
 45 In re Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Brain, Tyson & Layton, supra note 32. 
 48 Id.  The second base station facilitates the changeover to the new cell site by 
sending a signal via a control channel that prompts the subscriber’s phone to switch 
to a new frequency that then carries the call.  Id. 
 49 See Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 39. 
 50 How Wireless Works, CTIA WIRELESS ASS’N, 
http://ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10539 (last visited Mar. 5, 
2012).  This process is known as roaming, and it is what helps expand the areas in 
which cell phones are operational.  Id. 
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ness practice, even the subscriber’s cell phone communications with 
cell sites that other CSPs operate. 
B. The Methods Used to Approximate Location 
CSPs store a subscriber’s registration information in a database 
so that communications are routed to the user’s phone via the closest 
cell site.
51
  While the actual communications are only carried on a 
single channel from one cell site,
52
 the phone’s signal is still receiva-
ble by more than one cell site.
53
  CSLI is the term used to describe the 
records that CSPs keep regarding which cell sites carried a subscrib-
er’s call and which cell sites received the phone’s signal.  Because 
more than one cell site usually receives the signal, one can determine 
the approximate location of the phone by using one of two common 
methods: Time Distance of Arrival (TDOA) or Angle of Arrival 
(AOA).
54
 
TDOA requires three cell sites to receive the same signal.
55
  Be-
cause the user is not typically equidistant from all three cell sites, the 
signal will arrive at each cell site at a different point in time.
56
  This 
time difference is then analyzed and combined with the known coor-
dinates of the three cell sites to generate the estimated latitude and 
longitude of the phone.
57
 
AOA, on the other hand, requires only two cell sites to receive 
the same signal and is based on calculating the angle at which the 
signal travelled from a user’s phone to the cell site.
58
  After determin-
ing the angle by which the phone’s signal travelled to each cell site, 
one can determine the approximate location of the cell phone using 
the known locations of the two cell sites.
59
 
TDOA generally produces a narrower estimate of location than 
AOA, but both provide reliable approximations of a cell phone’s lo-
 
 51 For a detailed discussion how cell phones communicate, see supra Part II.A. 
 52 See supra text accompanying notes 45–46. 
 53 See Time Difference of Arrival Location Determination, DISPATCH MAG. ON-LINE, 
http://www.911dispatch.com/911/tdoa.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter 
Time Difference of Arrival Location Determination]. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 AOA–Angle of Arrival, TRUEPOSITION, http://www.trueposition.com/aoa (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter AOA–Angle of Arrival]. 
 59 Id. 
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cation.
60
  Both of these forms of location approximation do not re-
quire adding anything to a cell phone because all of the calculations 
are based on the recorded signal information that the phone sends 
out and the known coordinates of the receiving cell sites.
61
  Thus, one 
can determine the general area of a cell phone’s location by simply 
using information that CSPs record and store in their regular course 
of business without modifying or implementing a subscriber’s phone 
in any way. 
Some scholars have argued that using TDOA or AOA to deter-
mine the past approximate location of a cell phone is an impermissi-
ble violation of one’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights because it 
could provide police with information about an individual’s location 
that might otherwise be unobtainable.
62
  But this information helps 
police respond to 911 calls faster, and it can provide valuable infor-
mation to assist in solving heinous crimes and crimes perpetrated by 
law enforcement officers.
63
  Critics acknowledge the benefits that 
CSLI provides to law enforcements agencies, however, some still ar-
gue that both historic and prospective CSLI should not be obtainable 
without a showing of probable cause and the issuance of a warrant.
64
  
Because historic CSLI does not provide the government with the 
same information that a tracking device produces, and because it is a 
third party who collects and maintains the information in the regular 
course of business, the critics’ analogies of historic CSLI to tracking 
devices are incorrect, and the Fourth Amendment concerns purport-
edly implicated are not constitutionally supported. 
 
 60 U-TDOA-Uplink Time Difference of Arrival, TRUEPOSITION (last visited Mar. 5, 
2012), http://www.trueposition.com/u-tdoa/. 
 61 See AOA—Angle of Arrival, supra note 58; see also Time Difference of Arrival Location 
Determination, supra note 53.  
 62 See, e.g., Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historic Cell Site Loca-
tion Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1745, 1752, 1788 (2009) (arguing that locational data gleaned from CSLI, historic or 
prospective, mandates Fourth Amendment protection); Stephanie Lockwood, Who 
Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal 
Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 317 (2004) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment 
should apply to CSLI). 
 63 Peter J. Sampson, Cellphones Give Feds Insight into Criminal Activity, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/114072489_Feds_dialed_in_to_criminals.html?p
age=all. 
 64 See sources cited supra note 62. 
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS 
ACT 
A. Relevant Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”
65
  As a threshold matter, Fourth 
Amendment protections apply only when there is a “search” or “sei-
zure.”
66
  Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States set forth 
a two-prong test to determine whether a search has occurred.
67
  The 
test requires that an individual first “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
68
  Thus, for an indi-
vidual to successfully claim that a Fourth Amendment “search” has 
taken place, he or she must harbor a personal expectation of privacy 
in the information, and that personal expectation of privacy must be 
shared by an objective, reasonable person.
69
  If either prong is not sat-
isfied, then a search has not taken place, and the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protections are not implicated.
70
 
Section 2703 of the SCA permits the government to search sub-
scribers’ records.
71
  The Supreme Court has examined the govern-
ment’s search of an individual’s records in the past, but has not di-
rectly ruled on § 2703.  In 1976 in United States v. Miller, the Court 
addressed whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred when the 
government compelled two banks to disclose a customer’s records.
72
  
In Miller, government agents presented subpoenas to the presidents 
of the two banks requiring the production of all records of accounts 
in Miller’s name.
73
  The banks complied with the government’s re-
quest without advising Miller about the subpoenas.
74
  All records were 
 
 65 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 66 Id. 
 67 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. 
 71 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006). 
 72 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (finding no expectation of privacy in bank rec-
ords because there is an inherent risk that the information an individual gives to the 
bank will be relayed to the government). 
 73 Id. at 437. 
 74 Id. at 438. 
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made available to the agents, as well as copies of any documents that 
the agents wished to have.
75
 
Although Miller argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
existed in the information he provided to the banks, the Court held 
that the compelled disclosure of Miller’s financial records from the 
two banks did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
76
  The 
Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not provide privacy 
protection for an individual’s bank records because the documents 
were “business records of the banks.”
77
  The bank was a party to all of 
Miller’s transactions that were disclosed to the government,
78
 the 
checks represented “negotiable instruments to be used in commer-
cial transactions,” and the deposit slips and financial statements rep-
resented voluntarily conveyed information.
79
  Thus, Miller “possessed 
no Fourth Amendment interest” because the compelled disclosure of 
the information was not a search, eliminating the need for a reasona-
bleness assessment or a warrant to obtain the financial information.
80
 
Underlying the Court’s rationale in this decision was the “as-
sumption of the risk” doctrine, which is premised on the fact that, 
when one voluntarily provides information to a third party, one as-
sumes the risk that the information may be disclosed to the govern-
ment.
81
  Three years later, the Court used the same rationale for pen 
registers.  In Smith v. Maryland, the Court addressed “the question 
whether the [government’s] installation and use of a pen register 
constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”
82
  The Court distinguished the use of a pen register from a lis-
tening device because pen registers “do not acquire the contents of 
communications”; they merely acquire the numbers dialed.
83
  The 
Court used this determination to characterize the defendant’s argu-
ment as a “claim that he had a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ re-
garding the numbers he dialed on his phone.”
84
 
 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 442–43. 
 77 Id. at 440. 
 78 Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–41. 
 79 Id. at 442. 
 80 Id. at 445. 
 81 Id. at 443. 
 82 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979).  A pen register is a “mechanical device that records 
the numbers dialed on a telephone.” Id. n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 
434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)). 
 83 Id. at 741. 
 84 Id. at 742. 
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In evaluating the subjective expectation of privacy prong, the 
Court noted that “[t]elephone users . . . typically know that they must 
convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone 
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the 
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of 
legitimate business purposes.”
85
  Furthermore, the Court declared 
that, even if Smith had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expec-
tation was not objectively reasonable.
86
  Returning to the “assumption 
of the risk” doctrine used in Miller, the Court held that dialed num-
bers constituted “information . . . voluntarily turn[ed] over to third 
parties,” in which courts have consistently denied an expectation of 
privacy.
87
  Because the “petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical in-
formation to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that infor-
mation[,] . . . . [he] assumed the risk that the company would reveal 
to police the numbers he dialed.”
88
  Thus the warrantless use of a pen 
register to record the numbers that Smith dialed did not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.
89
 
Shortly thereafter in a pair of cases decided in consecutive 
terms, United States v. Knotts
90
 and United States v. Karo,
91
 respectively, 
the Court addressed the use of tracking beepers by law enforcement 
agencies to determine the location of chemicals suspected of being 
used for drug production.  Employing the use of beepers allows law 
enforcement agents to track the object the beeper has been attached 
to by following the emitted signals,
92
 similar to the way in which one 
can compute historic CSLI to create a general picture of the move-
ments of a cell phone, but with greater accuracy and in real-time. 
In Knotts, law enforcement agents installed a tracking beeper in 
a drum of chloroform suspected of being used to manufacture drugs 
 
 85 Id. at 743. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 743–44. 
 88 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
 89 Id. at 745–46. 
 90 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that no Fourth Amendment search oc-
curred when the government used a tracking beeper because the information it pro-
vided could have been obtained by following the drum of chloroform’s public 
movements).  A tracking beeper is a “radio transmitter . . . which emits periodic sig-
nals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.”  Id. at 277. 
 91 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding that a Fourth Amendment search did occur 
when the government’s use of a tracking beeper revealed information about the in-
terior of a home that was unobservable from a public place).   
 92 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
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and traced the drum to a secluded residence using the beeper.
93
  The 
Court noted that the record did not show that the beeper was used 
again once the signal indicated that the drum was stationary and lo-
cated in the area of the secluded residence.
94
  The agents then used 
the beeper transmissions and the information obtained from visual 
surveillance of the residence to secure a search warrant.
95
 
The Court held that the use of the beeper in Knotts did not con-
stitute a Fourth Amendment search because law enforcement did not 
invade any reasonable expectation of privacy.
96
  Sitting outside of the 
residence, the drum was observable from public places, and it trav-
elled from the point of purchase to the residence over public roads.
97
  
The information that the beeper provided would have been ascer-
tainable by “[v]isual surveillance from public places  . . . .  Nothing in 
the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the 
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhance-
ment as science and technology afforded them in this case.”
98
  The 
Court also reiterated that “[a] person travelling in an automobile on 
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”
99
  Thus, no search had taken 
place because the information gleaned from the beeper was no dif-
ferent than information that law enforcement agents could have ob-
tained by observing the public movements of the drum of chloro-
form.
100
 
The following term, the Court revisited law enforcement agents’ 
warrantless use of tracking beepers.  In Karo, police placed a tracking 
beeper inside a container of ether that they suspected was going to be 
used to extract cocaine from clothing.
101
  Law enforcement agents 
used the beeper, along with visual surveillance, to follow the ether 
from the point of purchase to a residence, but use of the beeper did 
not end once the location of the residence was known.
102
  The police 
continually used the beeper over a prolonged period of time to track 
the ether, and determined its location to be inside different private 
 
 93 Id. at 277–78. 
 94 Id. at 278–79. 
 95 Id. at 279. 
 96 Id. at 285. 
 97 Id. at 282. 
 98 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
 99 Id. at 281. 
 100 Id. at 285. 
 101 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984). 
 102 Id. 
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residences on multiple occasions.
103
  Part of the information that the 
agents provided to obtain a search warrant for the final residence was 
the tracking beeper’s location.
104
 
The Court distinguished the facts of Karo from those in Knotts.  
The Karo Court noted that the agents conceded that the tracking 
beeper was used to locate the can of ether inside a particular private 
residence.
105
  The question presented, therefore, was “whether the 
monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to 
visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those 
who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”
106
  Be-
cause the beeper provided the police with information not ascertain-
able by visual surveillance from outside the curtilage of the home, the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment privacy interest that an indi-
vidual has in his or her private residence was violated.
107
  Thus, the 
Court drew a public/private dichotomy when analyzing the Fourth 
Amendment implications of warrantless use of a tracking beeper. 
B. The Language and Protections of the Stored Communications Act 
The SCA regulates access to stored wire and electronic commu-
nications information and transactional records.
108
  The SCA de-
scribes the procedures available to law enforcement agencies to ob-
tain this information and clearly creates two separate, exclusive 
categories: information and records that contain the contents of 
communications
109
 and information or records that do not contain 
the contents of communications.
110
  Section 2703 prescribes the pro-
cedures that the government must follow to obtain information con-
taining the contents of communications in electronic storage,
111
 in-
formation containing the contents of communications in a remote 
 
 103 Id. at 708–10. 
 104 Id. at 709–10. 
 105 Id. at 714. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (“[The beeper] reveal[ed] a critical fact about the interi-
or of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that 
it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”).   
 108 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006). 
 109 § 2703(a)–(b) (providing the requirements for compelled disclosure of the 
contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic storage and a remote 
computing service, respectively). 
 110 § 2703(c) (providing the requirements for compelled disclosure of “record[s] 
or other information pertaining to a subscriber . . . (not including the contents of 
communications)”). 
 111 § 2703(a).  
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computing service,
112
 and records in electronic storage or a remote 
computing service that do not include the communications’ con-
tents.
113
 
A law enforcement agency may compel disclosure of information 
that does not include the content of the communications if the agen-
cy meets the guidelines of § 2703(c).
114
  There are three different 
means by which a law enforcement agency may compel a CSP to dis-
close a subscriber’s CSLI: the agency may “obtain[] a warrant,”
115
 “ob-
tain[] a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d),”
116
 or 
get “the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure.”
117
 
Specifically, a § 2703(d) “court order for disclosure . . . shall is-
sue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the 
records or other information sought[] are relevant and material to 
an ongoing criminal investigation.”
118
  Therefore, a law enforcement 
agency’s showing of reasonable suspicion is enough for a court to 
grant a governmental entity’s § 2703(d) order request.  The govern-
ment is not statutorily required to show probable cause in order to 
obtain a court order compelling a CSP to disclose a subscriber’s rec-
ords. 
In practice, however, judges do not always uphold this standard.  
The same district in New York has applied two different standards to 
§ 2703(d) requests by the government.  A magistrate judge denied an 
application for a § 2703(d) order compelling disclosure of historic 
CSLI due to “the Fourth Amendment requir[ing] the government to 
obtain a warrant, based on a showing of probable cause on oath or 
affirmation, in order to secure” the historic CSLI sought.
119
  The opin-
ion acknowledged that the information sought was limited to historic 
CSLI for a specified period, but the court held that such information 
was protected by the Fourth Amendment.
120
 
 
 112 § 2703(b). 
 113 § 2703(c). 
 114 Id. 
 115 § 2703(c)(1)(A). 
 116 § 2703(c)(1)(B). 
 117 § 2703(c)(1)(C). 
 118 § 2703(d). 
 119 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical 
Cell-Site Information, No. 10-MJ-0550, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88781, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 27, 2010). 
 120 Id. at *13. 
FOX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  2:21 PM 
784 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:769 
At the other end of the spectrum, a district court judge granted 
the government’s § 2703(d) order request to compel a CSP to dis-
close prospective CSLI after presenting “specific and articulable facts 
showing reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought 
[wa]s relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
121
  
These two cases, both from the Eastern District of New York, are a 
perfect example of the discrepant standards that currently exist for § 
2703(d) order requests by the government.  This illustrates the lack 
of uniformity in the application of a single statutory provision. 
Historic CSLI is content free, and reveals the cell site with which 
a cell phone communicated during a call, not the information that 
was communicated during a call.
122
  Still, historic CSLI must fall with-
in the scope of the SCA for § 2703 to compel CSP disclosure.  When 
applying the SCA, courts must read the definition of certain SCA 
terms using the definitions that Congress gave to the identical terms 
under § 2510.
123
  Because the SCA only applies to “stored wire and 
electronic communications,” the threshold question is whether the 
information sought constitutes wire communications or electronic 
communications as defined by § 2510.
124
 
C. Judge Sloviter’s Opinion’s Interpretation and Application of the 
SCA 
Commentators have argued that cell phones do not send or re-
ceive wire communications
125
 because the transfer of information is 
not “made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the 
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other 
like connection between the point of origin and the point of recep-
tion.”
126
  While it is true that a cell phone operates as a radio,
127
 in In re 
 
 121 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Reg-
ister and Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also 
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Infor-
mation on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(stating, after granting a § 2703(d) order for prospective CSLI based on only a show-
ing of reasonable suspicion, that it would reveal the cell phone’s “general location—
and in some circumstances, permit law enforcement agents to track the precise 
movements—of a particular cellular telephone on a real-time basis”). 
 122 See supra Part II.B (describing that CSLI is information that pertains to the cell 
site the wireless phone communicated with, not the actual content of a call, message, 
or information that was sent or received by the wireless phone). 
 123 18 U.S.C.  § 2711(1) (2006). 
 124 Id. § 2703. 
 125 See Chamberlain, supra note 62, at 1757 (arguing that the cell phones are au-
tomatically excluded from wire communications because of their wireless operation). 
 126 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006). 
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Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electron-
ic Communication Services to Disclose Records to the Government, Judge 
Sloviter affirmed that CSLI “consists of records of information col-
lected by cell towers when a subscriber makes a cellular call.  That 
historical record is derived from a ‘wire communication’ and does 
not itself comprise a separate ‘electronic communication.’”
128
 
Electronic communication, the other category of information 
obtainable under the SCA, is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmit-
ted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photoptical system.”
129
  The definition, however, 
excludes four types of communications that would otherwise quali-
fy,
130
 one of which is “any communication from a tracking device” as 
defined by § 3117.
131
 
A tracking device is “an electronic or mechanical device which 
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”
132
  Thus, 
commentators have also argued that the compelled disclosure of his-
toric CSLI based on the SCA alone pursuant to a § 2703(d) order re-
quires a showing of probable cause and a warrant because a cell 
phone meets the statutory definition of a tracking device and is there-
fore excluded from the SCA.
133
  This argument, however, overlooks 
the fact that “the Senate Report on the ECPA, which encompasses the 
SCA, defines ‘electronic tracking devices’ as ‘one-way radio commu-
nication devices that emit a signal on a specific radio frequency . . . 
[that] can be received by special tracking equipment, and allows the 
user to trace the geographical location of the transponder.’”
134
  Since 
cell phones are sophisticated two-way radios,
135
 unlike the devices de-
scribed in the Senate report, the tracking device definition of § 
 
 127 How Wireless Works, supra note 11. 
 128 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 129 § 2510(12) (emphasis added); see How Wireless Works, supra note 11 (explaining 
that cell phones are sophisticated two-way radios). 
 130 § 2510(12)(A)–(D). 
 131 § 2510(12)(C). 
 132 § 3117(b). 
 133 See, e.g., Chamberlain, supra note 62 at 1775–77 (arguing that a cell phone falls 
under the statutory definition of a tracking device, and therefore the SCA prohibits 
compelled disclosure of historic CSLI absent a showing of probable cause). 
 134 In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t , 620 F.3d 304, 309 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564). 
 135 How Wireless Works, supra note 11. 
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3117(b) does not encompass cell phones.  Thus, historic CSLI is not 
excluded from the SCA because historic CLSI qualifies as a record of 
electronic communications.
136
 
Furthermore, under the definition of CSLI as a wire communi-
cation,
137
 even if a cell phone was considered a tracking device, the 
government could still compel CSP disclosure because the tracking 
device exclusion only applies to stored electronic communications, 
not stored wire communications.
138
  Thus, Judge Sloviter’s opinion 
correctly held “that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under a 
§ 2703(d) order and . . . such an order does not require the tradi-
tional probable cause determination.”
139
  Instead, the reasonable sus-
picion language in the text of § 2703(d) is the minimum standard 
that applies to a § 2703(d) order request.
140
 
This finding, however, was not the end of the Third Circuit’s 
statutory examination of § 2703(d).  Upon a closer reading of the 
statute, the court revealed that the language employed in § 2703(d) 
seemingly sets reasonable suspicion as the floor, but allows for the 
exercise of judicial discretion in requiring a higher standard.
141
  Sec-
tion 2703(d) clearly states that “[a] court order for disclosure under 
subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of com-
petent jurisdiction and shall issue only if” reasonable suspicion is 
met.
142
  Focusing first on the “may be issued” language, the court stat-
ed that it was “the language of permission, rather than mandate.  If 
Congress wished that courts ‘shall,’ rather than ‘may,’ issue § 2703(d) 
orders whenever . . . [reasonable suspicion] is met, Congress could 
easily have said so.”
143
  The court went on to declare that “[a]t the very 
least, the use of ‘may issue’ strongly implies court discretion.”
144
 
 
 136 In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 
312–13. 
 137 Id. at 310 
 138 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 129–32 (ex-
plaining that tracking devices are excluded from the statutory definition of electron-
ic communications). 
 139 In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 
313. 
 140 Id. (quoting the standard provided in the text of § 2703(d) as requiring “spe-
cific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other infor-
mation sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”). 
 141 Id. at 315. 
 142 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 143 In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. , 620 F.3d 
at 315. 
 144 Id.  
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Noting this discretionary language, the court examined the “on-
ly if” language next.
145
  Relying on a previous Third Circuit decision, 
the court articulated that the “phrase ‘only if’ describe[s] a necessary 
condition, not a sufficient condition, and that while a ‘necessary con-
dition describes a prerequisite,’ a ‘sufficient condition is a guaran-
tee.’”
146
  Therefore, according to the Third Circuit, the statute does 
not require a judge to issue a § 2703(d) order compelling a CSP to 
disclose a record upon a showing of reasonable suspicion by the gov-
ernment, but rather it is the minimum requirement that must be met 
for such an order to issue.
147
 
Thus, Judge Sloviter’s opinion correctly found that historic CSLI 
is obtainable under § 2703(d) of the SCA regardless of whether one 
characterizes historic CSLI as an electronic communication or a wire 
communication.  Because cell phones are not included in the track-
ing device definition of § 3117(b), historic CSLI is not one of the 
four types of electronic communications excluded from being ob-
tainable under the SCA.  Additionally, historic CSLI is derived from a 
wire communication because it is a record collected by a cell tower.  
Thus, historic CSLI is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order upon the 
statutorily required showing of reasonable suspicion, and the tradi-
tional probable cause determination is not required. 
IV. CSLI, FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE, AND 
MISINTERPRETATION OF JUDGE SLOVITER’S OPINION 
While the court’s statutory interpretation and application are 
generally sound, the court’s cursory Fourth Amendment analysis of 
historic CSLI was incorrect.  The Fourth Amendment does not pro-
tect historic CSLI.  By leaving that possibility open, Judge Sloviter’s 
opinion will not eliminate the discrepant standards that judges apply 
to § 2703(d) order requests.  While the court did not hold that the 
Fourth Amendment protects historic CSLI, it allowed a magistrate 
judge to make such a finding in the future.
148
  Should the magistrate 
so find, “a full explanation that balances the Government’s need (not 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 316 (quoting Township of Tinicum v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 582 F.3d 
482, 488–89 (3d. Cir. 2009)). 
 147 See id. at 316–17 (reiterating the Third Circuit’s previous interpretation of 
identical statutory language, accepting the EFF brief’s argument that this creates a 
“sliding scale,” and rejecting the government’s argument that the language provides 
for mandatory issuance of an order if reasonable suspicion is shown). 
 148 Id. at 319. 
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merely desire) for the information with the privacy interests of cell 
phone users” is necessary.
149
 
Curiously, the court rejected the “assumption of the risk” doc-
trine as applicable to CSLI based on the finding that “[a] cell phone 
customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a 
cellular provider in any meaningful way.”
150
  The “assumption of the 
risk” doctrine was the underlying rationale that the Supreme Court 
used in deciding both Miller and Smith.
151
  Here, the court relied on 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) brief’s claim that cell 
phone subscribers are unlikely to be aware that a CSP records histori-
cal CSLI.
152
  This assertion is inapposite to the Supreme Court’s ra-
tionale in the Smith decision. 
In Smith, the telephone customer was presumed to know that the 
phone company would record, for business purposes, the numbers 
he dialed on his telephone.
153
  Furthermore, the Court explicitly held 
that the dialed numbers were information voluntarily conveyed to a 
third party.
154
  The same reasoning and rationale apply directly to cell 
phone subscribers and historic CSLI.  CSPs record CSLI for business 
purposes, and a cell phone customer should similarly be presumed to 
know that this information will be recorded because CSPs use it to 
determine roaming charges that appear on a subscriber’s monthly 
statement.
155
  Thus, the roaming charges on the billing statement in-
dicate to the subscriber that the physical location of the phone dur-
ing a call is known and recorded by the subscriber’s CSP in its regular 
course of business.  Thus, by using the cell phone the subscriber vol-
untarily conveys to the CSP the phone’s general geographical loca-
tion. 
Additionally, the prevalence of cell phones with GPS functions 
and subscribers’ increased use of these services
156
 directly undermine 
the position that cell phone customers are not “voluntarily” sharing 
their location information with CSPs.  Therefore, a cell phone user 
 
 149 In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at 
319. 
 150 Id. at 317. 
 151 See supra text accompanying notes 81, 87–88 (describing the “assumption of 
the risk” doctrine and its application to the facts of Miller and Smith). 
 152 In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. , 620 F.3d 
at 317. 
 153 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
 154 Id. at 743–44. 
 155 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 156 See supra note 1–3 and accompanying text. 
FOX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  2:21 PM 
2012] COMMENT 789 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the CSLI that the CSP 
records when the user makes or receives a call because the subscriber 
has voluntarily shared this information with the CSP and assumes the 
risk that the CSP may turn the information over to law enforcement 
agencies.  Moreover, cell phone subscribers who simply pay their 
monthly bills without looking at them and who do not have GPS 
functions on their phones are still likely to know that the government 
uses such techniques due to the high-profile crimes that law en-
forcement agencies have reported and solved with the help of CSLI.
157
 
Furthermore, when analyzing CSLI, courts must apply the pub-
lic/private dichotomy that the Knotts and Karo decisions created.  In 
Knotts, the Court emphasized the fact that law enforcement agents 
only used the tracking beeper to follow the movements of a drum of 
chloroform on public thoroughfares until they determined that the 
drum had come to rest in the area of a secluded residence, at which 
time they discontinued the use of the tracking beeper and visually 
confirmed the presence of the drum of chloroform outside the resi-
dence.
158
  The Court was quick to distinguish these facts in Karo, in 
which law enforcement agents used the tracking beeper to confirm 
the presence of a can of ether inside multiple residences, on multiple 
occasions.
159
  The Fourth Amendment protections afforded to the 
home made the warrantless use of a tracking beeper that revealed 
otherwise unascertainable information and that was conducted from 
outside the curtilage of the residence unconstitutional.
160
 
Moreover, CSLI requires different treatment than tracking 
beepers because CSLI does not provide the precise location infor-
mation of a cell phone, but it does provide the CSP with the cell site 
that helped carry a call.
161
  This information does not provide the ac-
tual location of the cell phone because CSLI only gives the cell tower 
location used to carry a call and because location calculations based 
on cell towers give only an approximation of a subscriber’s phone’s 
location.
162
  If multiple cell sites record CSLI, the approximate loca-
tion of the cell phone at the initiation of the call can be computed.
163
  
This approximate location, however, provides the general area of the 
 
 157 See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 158 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278–79 (1983). 
 159 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708–10 (1984). 
 160 Id. at 715. 
 161 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text 
 162 See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text 
 163 See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text 
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caller, not the exact location.
164
  A tracking beeper, on the other 
hand, can be traced to a precise location.
165
  Thus, even using TDOA 
or AOA,
166
 historic CSLI cannot show that a subscriber was at a par-
ticular place at a particular time; it can only show that the phone was 
in the general area. 
In light of these two characteristics, CSLI falls outside of the tra-
ditional Fourth Amendment protections.  Accordingly, when a law 
enforcement agent uses voluntarily conveyed historic CSLI infor-
mation to approximate a subscriber’s location, it does not constitute 
a Fourth Amendment search.  Thus, the necessary “search” or “sei-
zure” required for applying the Fourth Amendment protections
167
 is 
not met when CSPs disclose historic CSLI to a law enforcement agen-
cy, but Judge Sloviter’s opinion’s failure to make this determination 
has left magistrate judges without a definitive guideline for granting § 
2703(d) orders. 
Admittedly, the statute provides for judicial discretion in grant-
ing § 2703(d) orders, but had the Third Circuit thoroughly analyzed 
the Fourth Amendment’s application to historic CSLI, it would have 
held Fourth Amendment protections inapplicable to historic CSLI 
and curbed judicial discretion in granting § 2703(d) orders for this 
particular type of information.  As it currently stands, a judge may re-
quire probable cause for a § 2703(d) order requesting historic CSLI 
if the privacy interests of the cell phone user outweigh the govern-
ment’s need for the information.
168
  A finding that cell phone sub-
scribers do not have a privacy interest in historic CSLI would have 
eliminated the possibility for discrepant application of standards in § 
2703(d) order requests for historic CSLI. 
V. PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT 
Because Judge Sloviter’s opinion has not alleviated the possibility 
of magistrate judges applying discrepant standards to § 2703(d) re-
quests, which results directly from the permissive statutory language, 
a statutory amendment is well overdue.  Eliminating the “only if” lan-
guage from § 2703(d), as well as changing “may be issued” to “shall 
 
 164 See  supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text 
 165 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
 166 For a discussion of the TDOA and AOA methods for determining approximate 
location of a cell phone, see supra notes 54– 61 and accompanying text 
 167 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also supra text accompanying note 65. 
 168 In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to the Gov’t , 620 F.3d 304,319 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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be issued” would correct the current problem.  An amended version 
of § 2703(d) would then read: 
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) shall be is-
sued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and 
shall issue if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the rec-
ords or other information sought, are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation. 
Although the Fourth Amendment does not protect historic 
CSLI,
169
 the revised statute would still provide a level of judicial over-
sight that would prevent law enforcement agencies from conducting 
fishing expeditions.  In order for the government to compel a CSP to 
disclose historic CSLI, courts would still require specific and articula-
ble facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the contents of the records sought are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.  Thus, unless the government can 
provide a judge with information showing reasonable suspicion that a 
subscriber’s cell phone records are material to on ongoing criminal 
investigation, a § 2703(d) order would not be granted. 
Alternatively, if Congress believes that cell phone users have a 
strong privacy interest in historic CSLI, Congress should entirely 
eliminate the § 2703(d) order requirement from the SCA, and courts 
should apply the probable cause or subscriber-consent standards re-
quired by § 2703(a)–(c).  Although the heightened requirement 
would provide a greater burden on the ability of law enforcement 
agencies to compel disclosure of historic CSLI, at least the applica-
tion of the statute would be uniform.  Currently, some citizens are er-
roneously granted Fourth Amendment privacy rights for their histor-
ic CSLI, while others are denied Fourth Amendment protection for 
their prospective CSLI.
170
  The Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
historic CSLI, leaving the statute as the only applicable protection.  
Therefore, an amendment to § 2703(d) is necessary to ensure that 
courts apply uniformly the protections that the SCA affords to histor-
ic CSLI. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To date, the Third Circuit is the first and only appellate court to 
weigh in on the appropriate standard for § 2703(d) order requests.  
 
 169 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 170 See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
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While the court’s statutory analysis concerning the definitions and 
applicability of § 2703(d) order requests to historic CSLI was correct, 
unfortunately, Judge Sloviter’s opinion failed to analyze the applica-
bility of the Fourth Amendment to historic CSLI.  By neglecting to 
highlight the constitutional distinction between prospective and his-
toric CSLI, the Third Circuit’s holding will likely fail to remedy the 
discrepant standards that courts have applied to the government’s § 
2703(d) order requests. 
Because of the ever-increasing dependence on cell phones by 
citizens in their day-to-day lives and by the government for solving 
crimes and providing services, the problem of discrepant application 
of standards for § 2703(d) order requests is sure to persist.  Absent a 
rapid increase in circuit court litigation that creates a split in authori-
ty on the matter that may prompt the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari, a congressional amendment to the statute is the only available 
remedy to this problem in the near future. 
Historic CSLI is only protected by the SCA, not the Fourth 
Amendment.  Probable cause is neither statutorily nor constitutional-
ly mandated for the disclosure of historic CSLI to law enforcement 
agencies.  Because, as demonstrated in this Comment, the problem 
will likely not find a solution in the courts, the impetus is on Congress 
to amend the statute to ensure equal application of § 2703(d)’s provi-
sions.  While Judge Sloviter’s opinion attempted to address and re-
solve the issue, ultimately the problem remains largely unchanged 
because it failed to address whether the Fourth Amendment applies 
to historic CSLI.  Had the Third Circuit performed this analysis, the 
discretionary language of § 2703(d) would have been rendered moot.   
The usefulness and benefits of historic CSLI to law enforcement 
agents conducting criminal investigations is readily apparent.  The 
Fourth Amendment does not protect historic CSLI, but Judge 
Sloviter’s opinion failed to make this finding and distinguish historic 
CSLI from prospective CSLI.  Thus, absent a circuit court holding 
historic CSLI is not protected by the Fourth Amendment or a statuto-
ry amendment by Congress, judges nationwide may still incorrectly 
grant historic CSLI Fourth Amendment privacy protections and con-
tinue to apply discrepant standards to § 2703(d) order requests by 
the government.  Unfortunately, the Third Circuit clarified the issue, 
but failed to resolve it, and the hope now is that Congress will amend 
the SCA and end the discrepant application of the statute.  
